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Abstract
Content providers often consider the costs of security to be greater than the losses
they might incur without it; many view \casual piracy" as their main concern. Our goal
is to provide a low cost defense against such attacks while maintaining rigorous security
guarantees.
Our defense is integrated with and leverages fast forward error correcting codes, such as
Tornado codes, which are widely used to facilitate reliable delivery of rich content. We tune
one such family of codes { while preserving their original desirable properties { to guarantee
that none of the original content can be recovered whenever a key subset of encoded packets
is missing. Ultimately we encrypt only these key codewords (only 4% of all transmissions),
making the security overhead negligible.
1 Introduction
The cost of securing bulk content for delivery is often viewed as prohibitively expensive. Many
content providers prefer to sidestep security issues in favor of optimizing transfer speed and client
capacity so as to maximize performance to the paying customers to which content providers must
cater. We propose a new method of securing content that signicantly lowers the costs of security
for both the server and its clients while still maintaining rigorous security guarantees.

The latest version of the paper and our ongoing experimental work is available at
http://www.cs.bu.edu/groups/aces/codes/
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Our techniques are based on leveraging well known all-or-nothing like properties of certain
fast forward error correction codes (FEC) such as Tornado codes [12]. These codes can be used
to facilitate the delivery of bulk content, particularly in the multicast case, as advocated using
the digital fountain paradigm [2]. By making minor modications to the codes and encrypting
about 4% of all transmissions, we ensure that an adversary intercepting the remaining plain-text
transmissions can not determine any information about a particular block of the le { individual
input blocks are completely undetermined by the packets sent as plain-text. This is essentially
the same security guarantee as that of [18, 23] (see Sec. 3.2 for more detailed discussion, including
limitations of these denitions).
Similar ideas of using preprocessing (some special scrambling or an all-or-nothing transform)
with the subsequent encryption of only a small part of the content has been proposed before, see
e.g. [10, 1]. The distinguishing feature of our work is that the pre-processing step we use is really
motivated by other considerations (namely, forward error-correction requirements); we need only
to slightly modify it, preserving the originally desired features. Thus, the preprocessing step can
be considered as already \paid for", and adding condentiality becomes almost free.
Since only 4% of the information sent is encrypted, there are clear advantages on both the
server and client sides. Reducing the amount of computational work on the server side is particu-
larly important for busy servers delivering popular content, but the savings are also signicant for
thin clients, such as embedded devices or mobile palmtops. Moreover, while speeding up o-line
encryption in group key settings is an important performance optimization, reducing the work
encrypting packets on a per-client basis by a factor of 25 can be a truly signicant reduction.
These techniques motivate a study of specic issues such as integration of security, compres-
sion and other issues. For example, since our techniques send most packets as plain-text and
expose signicant partial information, it is important for the entropy of the input to be high to
avoid basic statistical attacks. Fortunately, compression is already used for most bulk content
delivery and most schemes are geared to provide the highest entropy output. In particular, our
work makes explicit the amount of information exposed when plain-text is leaked. As a result, it
becomes possible to rigorously address the security provided and begin to examine the tradeos
as less encryption is used.
In this paper, we demonstrate lightweight techniques for securing content against eavesdrop-
pers which leverage sparse parity check codes, if these are already used. We show a clear tradeo
between expensive per-packet encryption and our techniques which can be provided nearly for
free once the content is appropriately encoded without losing rigorous security guarantees. Addi-
tionally, our techniques are modular enough that they can be implemented as black box \lters"
on the outgoing packets of a server and the incoming packets of a client thus providing security
with minimum knowledge of and interaction with encoding functionality. Our solution gives a
novel, cheap and easily applicable technique for adding encryption to encoded content and opens
a number of important research directions in providing rigorous security guarantees at lower cost
than full per-packet encryption. We also introduce the concepts and denitions intended to make
the study of light security more formal and precise.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We begin in Section 2 by describing the general
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Figure 1: Typical system using FEC encoding: Server subsystem is on the left and Client
subsystem(s) on the right.
implications of our approach in content delivery scenarios, and then develop three specic sce-
narios which stand to benet. Next, in Section 3, we give a technical presentation of the sparse
parity-check codes and the encryption methods which we use in our work. We demonstrate how
to build provably secure codes, and provide several key new denitions and theorems regarding
the level of security which can be obtained by our methods as well as future similar techniques.
In Section 4, we present the performance of our experimental system which integrates the com-
ponents presented in Section 3, focusing in on the performance of our modied codes and the
performance of dovetailing encoding and encryption. We conclude with future directions and
open problems in Section 5.
2 Bulk Content Delivery Scenarios and Requirements
In the scenarios we wish to secure, the goal is to reliably transmit rich (bulky) content to large
audiences with high concurrency. The primary challenge associated with delivering content to
large audiences which we consider is scalability. As session sizes grow, server side resources are
strained, often leaving little time for separate encryption of each packet across each session.
A canonical approach to deal with issues of scale is to use a reliable multicast paradigm,
whereby each of the server's transmissions are replicated inside the network and delivered to
the entire multicast group. Within such a paradigm, using FEC codes (see Fig. 1) is a natural
solution for dealing with widely varying packet losses across space and time [25] while avoiding the
well-known feedback implosion problem that arises when all members in a set of receivers must
acknowledge each transmission [13, 2]. As for securing content under the multicast paradigm,
the most common approach is to use a shared group key (i.e. one known to all clients) to encrypt
the data. The group key is initially distributed in some out-of-band fashion, and then it can
be maintained using secure in-band key updates (eÆcient group key management techniques
have been proposed e.g. [24] and eÆciently implemented [9]). Note that when a xed (time and
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Figure 2: Two \naive" ways to secure data streams in combination with FEC encoding.
connection invariant) group key is used, it is possible to encrypt content o-line. Such a system
can be implemented as either architecture of Fig. 2.
One potential issue with using the multicast channel for all encrypted packets is that a content
provider may prefer to have ner-grained control over who receives content. Thus, providers
may prefer to employ connections which provide a more personalized service than multicast
connections for ease of accounting (e.g. for billing purpose). Such personalized connections can
use any generic encrypted point-to-point channel, such as SSL [22]. But this preference defeats
the benets of multicast when every transmission must be individually encrypted for each client.
However, this approach is much more realistic when only 4% of the content must be encrypted
and transmitted over a dedicated connection, while the rest may be multicast in the clear {
without compromising security. We note that personalized connections can also be used as a
simple means of distributing the group key while the encrypted content is still sent over the
shared multicast channel.
Actual content delivery implementations which approximately realize the benets of the mul-
ticast paradigm can be divided into three categories. The rst, IP multicast [6], provides a best
eort IP multicast service, on top of which reliability can be supplied. IP multicast facilitates
packet replication inside the network to reach the set of multicast clients so it substantially re-
duces both network traÆc and the load at the server. Unfortunately, IP multicast has not yet
seen wide adoption over much of the Internet.
An alternative to IP multicast which has the potential to reduce server load, but does not
provide any reduction in network traÆc is the use of individual unicast connections to deliver
popular content. Of course, the server must then perform the extra work of sending packets
to each client individually. One way to oset some of the associated processing costs is to use
congestion-controlled UDP drawing FEC encoding packet payloads from a shared pool [20] (in
this case the data ow of Fig. 1 is owing over UDP). This method can also achieve asynchronous
reliability while minimizing I/O and computation costs at the server. In [20], the authors also
describe how these mechanisms can be applied to eÆciently deliver popular, encoded content
over TCP.
A hybrid approach is to use an overlay network [3, 19] and simulate a multicast network
using a collection of unicast tunnels. Each node, including the origin server, maintains low to
moderate fanout in the virtual multicast topology, thus each sends data to only a few hosts,
greatly distributing the delivery load across the system. However, these nodes are heterogeneous
and may not be computationally powerful, so minimizing use of resources continues to be crucial.
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Figure 3: Our system architecture: Most data ows as in the original system, with only 4%
fraction of the packets pipelinded through a secure channel.
In the ShapeShifter architecture [21], FEC codes are used over an overlay network to eÆciently
distribute content with better network utilization and fault tolerance.
For the rst two of these approaches (true multicast and true unicast), encryption is handled
in essentially the same fashion. FEC encoded is generated (possibly o-line) at the origin server
and passed to the encryption lter. This lter decides whether encryption is necessary and
sends it through the appropriate channel (noting there may be just one underlying channel with
optional encryption). On the other side of the network, the client lter decrypts any encrypted
packets received and sends both sets of packet to the FEC decoder which eventually outputs
the data. In the third approach (overlay), the possibilities are richer, rst since intermediate
nodes may be able to forward encrypted content to other nodes when personalized encryption
from the origin server is not a requirement. Also, in some scenarios, it is benecial (for more
eÆcient delivery) for overlay nodes to re-encode content. This particular enhancement can be
used completely transparently with our proposed encryption methods provided only un-encrypted
packets are used in re-encoding.
3 Secure FEC Codes and Cryptographic Primitives
The modules which will be used as building blocks in our secure content-delivery architecture
(see Figure 3) are FEC encoding and decoding modules as well as encryption and decryption
modules. While we are able to use any of a variety of encryption algorithms (we will use them
in a purely block-box fashion), the FEC codes which we employ must be specically customized
for our integrated security approach. We describe the class of codes we employ, the properties
we need from them, and the customizations we apply to achieve these properties rst.
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3.1 Background: Sparse Parity-Check Codes
Rabin [16] dened an Information Dispersal Algorithm (IDA) which disperses a le F of length `
into n pieces F
i
, 1  i  n each of length `=m such that the original le F can be reconstructed
from anym pieces, where n > m. Rabin cited many applications for this procedure, ranging from
dispersity routing, to storing les on disks which are prone to failure, to fault-tolerant broadcast.
While the general approach proposed by Rabin is very powerful, a limitation of the approach
is the computational complexity of the encoding and decoding operations he used. Most IDA
approaches use Reed-Solomon codes, which rely on cumbersome nite eld operations and have
O(n
2
) encoding and decoding times. Thus, while IDA works well for reconstructing a le stored
as n pieces distributed over n remote sites when n is 14 and m is 10, its decoding ineÆciency
is prohibitive when multicasting an encoded le spanning n packets when n is 10,000 and m is
5,000. An alternative approach relies on the use of sparse codes based on parity-check principles,
which can be encoded and decoded in nearly linear time, at the expense of relaxing the optimal
decoding guarantee provided in IDA [12, 2, 11].
Sparse parity-check codes facilitate fast encoding and decoding and are well suited to use
with large les and highly dispersed encodings. A document is divided into a collection of
m xed-length input symbols, or data packets, x
1
; : : : ; x
m
. An encoder produces a potentially
unbounded sequence of output symbols, or encoding packets
1
, y
1
; y
2
; : : : from the set of data
packets. With parity-check codes, each output symbol y
i
is simply the bitwise exclusive-or of
a subset of the input symbols, prepended with a list of the corresponding input symbols from
which y
i
is produced. Previous work on packetizing these output symbols [12, 2] describes how
to represent this list in compressed form into a small, xed-width eld (4 bytes is typical). For
a given output symbol, we refer to the cardinality of the subset of corresponding input symbols
used to produce it as its degree, i.e. y
3
= x
3
 x
4
has degree 2. We say that an encoding is
on-the-y or memoryless if the random subset of input symbols used to produce each output
symbol is drawn identically and independently from the same distribution D [11]. The time to
produce an encoding packet from a set of data packets is proportional to the degree of an output
symbol, while decoding from a sequence of output symbols takes time proportional to the sum of
the degrees of the output symbols in the sequence. Thus, while variable degree distributions D
may introduce some packets of large degree, it is important to note that encoding (and decoding)
times are a function of the average degree, not the maximum. It is therefore essential that the
codes used are sparse, i.e. the average degree is low.
A decoder attempts to recover the entire set of input symbols from a subsequence of the
output symbols. Sparse codes typically relax the ideal decoding guarantees provided with IDA
and Reed-Solomon codes. Such an erasure code is said to have average decoding ineÆciency 
if on average, a randomly chosen subsequence of length (1 + )m output symbols is suÆcient to
reconstruct the original le F . To minimize decoding ineÆciency, the distribution D of the size
of the subsets is of crucial importance. High performance can be achieved using variable degree
graphs, i.e. graphs in which degrees of output symbols are non-uniform [12]. The same paper
1
The packets in this sequence are not necessarily distinct.
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shows that a certain family of heavy-tailed degree distributions is a particularly good choice.
To summarize the ideas introduced so far, the use of sparse erasure codes provides an algo-
rithm which disperses a large le F of length ` into packets F
i
, 1  i  n, each of length p = `=m
such that the the original le F can be encoded in time O(dn), where d is the average degree
and can be reconstructed from a randomly chosen subsequence of (1 + )m (independent of n)
packets with high probability.
2
A set of n output symbols can be interpreted as a system of linear equations in m unknowns
(input symbols) with 0-1 coeÆcients. A canonical representation of which output symbols are in
the set would be in the form of an nm 0-1 matrix. The ith row of the matrix represents the input
symbols combined to form the ith output symbol where 0's represent the input symbols not used
and 1's represent the input symbols that were exclusive-ored together. In this representation,
encoding a set of output symbols ~y from a set of input symbols ~x and matrix Y can be described
by ~y = Y ~x where multiplication is multiplication by a scalar and addition is bit-wise exclusive-or.
We call Y a sparse parity-check encoding scheme, or spc-encoding scheme for short and say that
~y is an spc-encoding of ~x.
Given this representation as a set of linear equations, Gaussian elimination can be employed
as a quadratic time decoding algorithm. However, the advantage of sparse codes in decoding
is that the following (and computationally inexpensive) recovery rule can be employed instead:
Find any equation with exactly one variable, recover the value of the variable by setting it equal
to the value of the equation, then remove the newly recovered variable from any other equations
that it appears in by exclusive-or'ing its value into each of these equations. With this approach,
one can prove [12] that the total number of exclusive-or operations used to decode a set of output
symbols is equal to the sum of the degrees of the output symbols, i.e. achieving linear decoding
time with high probability, given a suitable degree distribution.
3.2 Securing Sparse Codes
Denition 1 Function f is packet-independent secure (pi-secure for short) if for all ~x =
hx
1
; : : : ; x
m
i, Pr(x
i
= vjf(~x)) = Pr(x
i
= v) for all v.
This denition is essentially equivalent to the security denition of [23] which deals with
all-or-nothing transforms [18] in the unconditional security model. In this case, f(~x) repre-
sents information sent as plaintext but no information about an individual x
i
is known without
additional information (which we send encrypted). Note that later work with all-or-nothing
transforms such as [1] add semantic security guarantees, thus avoiding information leaks about
~x present in [23] and our scheme.
In contrast to the schemes which had to do their own preprocessing [1, 10], we achieve pi-
security in the context of spc-encoding without additional overhead. One way to do this is to
make sure that Y has rank less than m and does not allow recovery of any x
i
. In general these
2
The codes we employ in this paper have  = :04 and d = 11 when applied to a 32 MB le with symbol size
1400B.
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requirements may be hard to combine with the on-the-y property of the encoding. However, a
simple special case fulls both requirements without any expensive verication: just assure that
all rows of Y have even number of 1s. Namely, call an spc-encoding scheme Y an spc2-encoding
if Y has an even number of 1s in each row.
Lemma 1 Spc2-encoding is pi-secure.
Proof: Let Y be an spc2-encoding scheme. Then the vector space spanned by the rows of Y
(under bit-wise exclusive-or) contains only even degree vectors (i.e. those with an even number
of 1's). Indeed, the sum (coordinate-wise exclusive-or) of any two vectors with even number of
1's, has an even degree of 1's. Thus any odd degree vector is independent of the row-vectors of
Y . In particular, a vector containing 0s everywhere except i-th position (which contains 1) is
independent from row-vectors of Y . Let us add this vector as a row vector (say as the 0th row)
to Y and call the resulting matrix Y
0
. And let us add an output symbol v as an output symbol
y
0
= v,
~
y
0
= hy
0
= v; y
1
; y
2
; : : :i. Since, for the given ~y, the equation Y ~u = ~y had a solution for
~u, and Y
0
was obtained by adding an independent row vector, then Y
0
~u =
~
y
0
also has a solution
for ~u. Moreover, this solution is guaranteed to have u
i
= v.
If an encoding is pi-secure, it protects the content, but it also prevents its decoding. In
order to enable decoding we must augment the pi-secure encoding with some additional output
symbols. Such additional output symbols must be communicated over a separate secure channel,
in order to preserve security. We now specify one natural way to provide pi-security, beginning
with a denition.
Denition 2 A repeated random pad encryption, or rp-encryption for short, of ~x with a random
pad p of xed-length is ~z = hp x
1
; : : : ; p x
m
i.
Corollary 1 Repeated random pad encryption is pi-secure.
Indeed, rp-encryption is equivalent to adding x
0
= p to the vector ~x to obtain vector
~
v
0
,
and computing the rp-encryption z = Y
~
x
0
, where Y is (m + 1)  m 0-1 matrix with i-th row
containing exactly two 1s: in position 0 and i.
This corollary highlights the relative weakness of pi-security in comparison to that of strong
encryption { it can be provided by \weak" encryption schemes. Nonetheless, this paper explores
how to achieve pi-security by restricting all encryption (\weak" or \strong") to apply only to a
small fraction of all the data. It is our hope that new techniques can and will be developed to
provide at least incremental improvements of our approach as compared to the \weak" encryption
schemes such as rp-encryption.
Specically, we propose to achieve pi-security by modifying the distributions discussed in
Section 3.1, so that all the output symbols are either degree-1 or are even-degree, while keeping
decoding ineÆciency low, and keeping the proportion of singleton output symbols around 4% or
less. Thus, the content can be protected by a pi-secure spc2-encoding plus encrypting of some
singletons. If we assume that the singletons are properly secured by the encryption, then the
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security of the content is reduced to the security of the spc2-encoding. Thus, we can at least
guarantee pi-security with our scheme. In fact, rp-encryption can be viewed as a special case of
such a construction, but missing the FEC properties of the codes in Section 3.1. Our preferred
method is to derive spc2-encoding which is very close to the distributions in Section 3.1.
The next two lemmas show that rp-encryption and spc2-encoding are polynomially equivalent
in their security in a strong way: namely, whatever can be learned about ~x from a repeated pad
encoding ~z can be learned from the even degree encoding ~y, and vice versa. In fact, we make
the polynomial equivalences more precise below. First we show that the encoding ~y itself can be
computed from the rp-encryption ~z in time O(md), where d is the average packet degree. Since
this is the same running time used to rpc-encode the content, if the spc2-encoding can be broken
(in any sense) eÆciently, than breaking the rp-encryption will incur at most additive overhead
O(md), i.e. the rp-encryption is not much more secure than the spc2-encoding.
Lemma 2 Let ~z be an rp-encryption of ~x and let matrix Y be an spc2-encoding scheme. Then
~y = Y ~x can be computed from ~z and Y in O(md) steps.
Proof: From ~z generate ~y = Y ~z = Y ~x. The second equality holds because the pads cancel each
other out, as there are an even number of 1s in each row of Y .
The relationship in the other direction is slightly more complex since the correspondence
between rp-encryption and spc2-encoding is one-to-many: a given rp-encoding determines spc2-
encoding, while there could be many rp-encryptions corresponding to a given spc2-encoding. The
next Lemma shows that an rp-encryption of any ~x with a uniformly distributed random pad can
be computed from an spc-2 encoding of ~x in O(m
2
) steps. We assume that the number of output
symbols n = O(m).
Lemma 3 Let Y be a 0-1 matrix of rank m   1, corresponding to an spc2-encoding scheme.
Then given an spc2-encoding ~y = Y ~x of some x, rp-encryption of ~x with a uniformly distributed
random pad can be computed in time O(m
2
).
Proof: The space of all even degree vectors has rank (m   1). Thus, Y contains a basis for
the space of all even degree vectors. In particular, the vectors corresponding to output symbols
~x
i
= x
1
x
i
for 1  i  m would be in that space. Thus, these output symbols could be obtained
by Gaussian elimination in O(m
2
) steps.
Now, pick any output packet value r uniformly at random, and assume that r = z
1
= x
1
 p
for some unknown, but also uniformly distributed pad p. The rp-encryption ~z of ~x with this p
can now be computed as z
i
= z
1
 ~x
i
in m  1 steps.
The above two lemmas imply that the security of even degree encoding is polynomially
equivalent to the security of repeated pad encryption. While the two schemes are polynomially
equivalent in their security, it is still possible that spc2-encoding is more secure than the rp-
encryption. For example, by Lemma 2, whatever can be extracted from the encoding in linear
time can also be extracted from the rp-encryption, also in linear time. But if some information
can be computed from the rp-encryption in linear time, it is not clear how to extract this
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information from the encoding faster than in quadratic time (due to Gaussian elimination) as
given by Lemma 3.
So, in the worst case, by resorting to Gaussian elimination, spc2-codes can be reduced to
repeated pad. If Gaussian elimination is necessary, this could provide some additional security {
since for large les Gaussian elimination could be prohibitively expensive. In this specic case,
it appears that a faster reduction might be possible (e.g. if more output symbols are collected),
but other methods of increasing security might be possible.
Our nal denition quanties precisely how much encoded content we must encrypt in order
to enable the remainder to be pi-secure:
Denition 3 An encoding is called -securable, 0    1, if for a randomly selected set of n
output symbols, there exists a pi-secure subset of (1  )n output symbols (i.e. the encoding can
be secured by securing only an  fraction of output symbols).
How can we achieve pi-security of the code in Section 3.1? Encrypting all odd degree symbols
is one possibility, but it still requires that a large fraction of codewords be encrypted. The degree
distributions we start with contain approximately 37% odd degree symbols so they are 0:37-
securable. The approach that we propose and ultimately adopt is to modify or adapt the degree
distribution so that the overwhelming majority of output symbols have even degree, while the
rest are of degree one. To secure such a code, only the degree one symbols need be encrypted;
all the rest may be sent as plaintext. Our experimental results in Section 4 show that we can
modify our output symbol distributions so that 1) all outcomes of a given odd degree can be
rounded up or down to the nearest even degree, 2) a low frequency of degree one packets can be
maintained and 3) the other desirable properties of the original encoding, such as low decoding
ineÆcency, can all be maintained. The upshot is a signicantly lowered cost of securing a code
against Gaussian elimination, since only approximately 4% of all packets need to be encrypted
to achieve this goal, which we state this as our main result.
Theorem 1 The content delivery scheme we have described is :04-securable.
3.3 Encryption Schemes
In this paper we consider three eÆcient symmetric key encryption schemes: the two block ciphers
Data Encryption Standard (DES) [14] and AES/Rijndael [5] cipher, and the stream cipher RC-
4 [17]. The latter two are among the fastest modern cipher algorithms. AES is the the recently
adopted Advanced Encryption Standard block cipher, which is intended to replace the veteran
DES cipher. RC-4 is one of the fastest and most commonly used stream ciphers. We include the
experiments using DES primarily for completeness and because it is probably the most widely
used cipher at present. As we will demonstrate, using slower cipher algorithms like DES only
strengthen the benets of our results.
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AES/Rijndael. Rijndael was recently selected as the Advanced Encryption Standard, ap-
proved by the National Institute of Standards and Technology, after extensive scrutiny and open
analysis by experts, based both on its strength and eÆciency. In our experiments we use CBC
(Cipher Block Chaining) mode with key size 128 bits and 128 bit block-size.
RC4. RC4 is a fast stream cipher. It requires a key with any size between 1 and 256 bytes to
initialize a 256-byte state table. Then a pseudo-random stream is generated by the state table
to be exclusive-or'ed with the plain-text for encrypting and with the cipher-text for decrypting
(such use of a pseudo-random one time pad is typical of stream ciphers). In this work, we use
128 bit (16 byte) key to initialize the state table.
DES. DES is one of the most used ciphers. It is widely deployed in applications ranging
from Internet (SSL) to pay-TV, implemented in hardware (for which it was originally designed)
and software. It uses 56-bit keys and 64-bit blocks. In its nearly 35 years of existence, it has
demonstrated extraordinary resistance to cryptanalysis. Only in recent years have the limits set
by its key size proven somewhat problematic, as successful attacks based largely on exhaustive
search are now feasible. However, due to their high cost and other technical requirements, such
attacks may not pose an immediate threat for many applications we focus on.
4 Experimental Results
Our experimental results are divided into two categories. The rst set of results describes our
methods for converting arbitrary degree distributions of sparse parity-check codes into distribu-
tions which can be secured by encrypting degree one output symbols and quanties the perfor-
mance cost of doing so. The second set describes our methods for combining erasure codes and
encryption and quanties the performance costs of using secure codes.
All of our experiments were run on an IBM Pentium III 930MHz machine with 384MB of
RAM running the Red Hat Linux version 6.2. Measurements were taken for le sizes ranging
from 1MB to 64MB. The time used for I/O operations was not included; only the time performing
encoding and decoding or encrypting and decrypting was measured. A symbol size of 1400 bytes
was used to make output symbols small enough to t into the MTU of our LANs (Ethernet)
while leaving space for packet headers and symbol identiers.
4.1 Building Good Sparse Codes
The degree distributions we adapt to our \one or even degree" requirement are based on a
heuristic using oracles, which we do not detail here, but which is fully described in [4]. This
approach enables a server to compute the output symbol degree most likely to advance a client's
decoding process given that the client has received k symbols from an initial distribution. The
server then iteratively renes the original degree distribution based on these computed values.
11
m 2
10
2
11
2
12
2
13
2
14
2
15
2
16
2
17
2
18
2
19
Average IneÆciency 0:175 0:101 0:060 0:040 0:045 0:024 0:024 0:017 0:017 0:014
Standard Deviation 0:066 0:029 0:014 0:008 0:042 0:011 0:007 0:003 0:013 0:009
Average Degree 10:7 15:5 13:6 13:7 11:6 14:3 18:8 19:0 15:4 16:6
Table 1: Statistics for Oracle Distributions (100 trials)
This approach can generate degree distributions with empirical decoding ineÆciencies comparable
to provable decoding guarantees in the literature such as Tornado Codes [12] though not quite
as low as some proprietary codes [7]. These degree distributions are easily adapted to our degree
restrictions and our experimental results show that the desirable properties such as low decoding
ineÆciency and average degree are preserved.
4.2 Picking a Good Graph
Although the codes we use are capable of generating an innite sequence of encoding packets, the
applications in this paper generally produce a nite number of output symbols whose degrees are
randomly chosen from a prex of this sequence. Therefore, we borrow an optimization also used
with Tornado codes to make sure that the beginning of the random out degree sequence behaves
well (i.e. it is not an outlier). A seed is randomly picked and 2m output symbols are generated
from the rst 2m degrees in the pseudo-random sequence produced by the seed. The utility of
the random seed is evaluated by the average decoding ineÆciency of 100 trials drawing from the
2m output symbols already generated. The seed with smallest average decoding ineÆciency is
then used for all trials. Note that this optimization should be done oine and only needs to be
done once for a particular m and a particular prex length.
4.3 Making Sparse Codes Securable
Our rst set of experiments deals with adapting existing degree distributions to meet the \one or
even" requirement while measuring the decoding ineÆciency (network usage) and time elapsed
(CPU usage). While the oracle based distributions can be directly created using only degree
one and even degrees, we focus on general transformations that could be applied to any degree
distribution (tuning the oracle directly gives similar results).
Our general approach is to generate output symbol degrees using the baseline distribution
and leave them unchanged if they are one or even. If the degree generated from the baseline
distribution is odd, we pick one of the neighboring even numbers to use in its place. This approach
is intended to minimize changes in the behavior of the decoding process (the degrees are similar,
particularly at the large scale) and in the average degree (it can change by at most one). Since
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Figure 4: Experimental Data for Securing Codes. (left) Average Decoding IneÆciency vs File
Size, (right) Average Decoding Time vs File Size
typical codes only have 4% output symbols of degree one, this approach also generates degree
distributions that are 0:04-securable.
We experiment with three ways to map odd degrees greater than one into neighboring even
degrees. When we say we \round" a degree, we mean we round it to the nearest even degree.
Round Up: Round up all odd degrees above one.
Round Down: Always round down odd degrees above one.
50/50: Round odd degrees above one up and down with equal probability.
Figure 4 shows our experimental results from modifying the degree distributions to make them
securable. Both Round Up and Round Down have signicantly higher decoding ineÆciencies
which do not improve as the le size increases. Both of these algorithms incur a decoding
ineÆciency penalty of roughly 8% over the original distribution. On the other hand, the decoding
ineÆciency of 50/50 is comparable to that of the original codes and incurs a decoding ineÆciency
penalty which is less than 1% for large les. For this reason, we employ 50/50 for the remainder
of our experiments.
In spite of the disparity between decoding ineÆciencies, the decoding times of all methods are
in surprisingly close correspondence. This is an artifact of the patient decoding implementation
we employ, which waits for additional output symbols before attempting to decode. As a re-
sult, redundant, high-degree symbols which contribute to the decoding ineÆciency are typically
discarded and do not contribute signicantly to the overall running time.
4.4 Adding Encryption to Securable Codes
Our second set of experiments deals with incorporating encryption into securable codes, in sce-
narios where both the encoding and encryption are done online. We consider the following ways
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of adding encryption to the transmission pipeline.
No Encoding: File is encrypted but not encoded.
3
Encode Decode Only: File is encoded but not encrypted.
Secure Code/100%: File is encoded with a securable code and all output symbols are en-
crypted.
Secure Code/4%: File is encoded with a securable code and all degree one output symbols are
encrypted.
We compare the costs of each of these methods of adding encryption using RC4, DES and
AES. We use the RC4 and DES implementations of the OpenSSL Project [15] and the AES
implementation at [8]. Both RC4 and AES use 128 bit keys and DES uses a 56 bit key in our
experiments. There are three noteworthy points depicted in Figure 5. First, as is to be expected,
the encryption and decryption times scale linearly with the le size, since the ciphers operate on
a per-packet basis. Second, for each of these ciphers, encryption and decryption times are very
similar; therefore, we only consider encryption times in our subsequent plots. And nally, each
of three ciphers provide rather dierent performance, with the fastest (RC4) running about four
times as fast as the slowest (AES).
Next we consider the relative costs of adding encryption and FEC in an integrated scheme.
Figure 6 summarizes the experiments adding encryption to securable codes using AES and RC4.
For large les, the slowest cipher (AES) requires an additional 103% time overhead to encrypt all
packets, but only 6% overhead to secure the code by encrypting just the degree one symbols, while
3
By encoding, we specically mean applying an erasure code.
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Figure 6: Experimental Data for Adding Encryption to Encoding
the fastest cipher (RC4) requires an additional 23% overhead vs. a 1% overhead, respectively.
DES (not shown) requires 88% and 4%. Clearly, there is a signicant advantage to using Secure
Code/4% for the more expensive ciphers and still a 20% speedup for the least expensive. Also,
we note that the slowest cipher with Secure Code/4% is faster than the fastest cipher with
Secure Code/100%. We emphasize that these experiments are conducted when both the FEC
encoding and the encryption is performed online, although as noted earlier, for many applications
it is natural to conduct encoding oine, in which case the speedups are even more dramatic. The
gains in all cases also intimately depend upon the relative speeds of the encoding and encryption
algorithms used.
5 Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper, we consider a problem which has not yet received much attention in either the
networking or security literature, namely, providing a level of security for content delivery appli-
cations which is strong enough to thwart casual piracy, yet does not require the full computational
horsepower of packet-level encryption. Such a method is especially useful for securing popular
content, when server resources are truly at a premium. Using conventional transmission of con-
tent, it is not clear how to specify such a middle ground whereby a tradeo between security
guarantees and computational resources is possible. However, when fast forward error correcting
codes are employed as part of the content delivery scheme, we demonstrate that certain encod-
ing schemes lend themselves naturally to \partial encryption," whereby only a small fraction of
the codewords generated are encrypted, while the rest are transmitted in the clear. Such an
approach has many advantages, notably 1) the encoding- encryption pipeline is modular and
easily congurable, 2) the encryption and decryption costs are minimal and 3) reconstructing
any given piece of the plain-text is provably hard (albeit not as hard as when full encryption is
employed).
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We view our current work as only a rst step in this direction, noting that there are a number
of potential improvements that can be made to both our denitions and our general approach.
For example, the current security guarantees we provide are comparable to those available when
a one-time pad is reused; ideally the hardness of reconstructing a piece of plain-text would scale
linearly with the number of encrypted bits not revealed to the adversary.
One of our goals was to demonstrate a possibility of achieving provable light security improve-
ments by introducing quadratic or greater overhead. Ideally, we would like to be able dene and
prove stronger notion of comparative security. For example, we had introduced one way to re-
late encodings E
1
; E
2
: E
1

c;
E
2
. However, this relationship does not provide separation. It
would be useful to prove results of the form E
1

c;
E
2
(i.e., E
1

c;
E
2
and E
1

c
0
;
E
2
for
no c
0
= o(c)). While in this paper we have succeeded proving that rp-encryption 
m
2
;(1 1=2
O(mÆ)
)
spc2-encoding, we did not prove rp-encryption 
m
2
;(1 1=2
O(mÆ)
)
spc2-encoding.
Our future work will also consider securing content delivery applications when fast forward
error correcting codes are not immediately applicable. For example, is there a general principle
that can render an arbitrary byte stream amenable to \partial encryption" of the form described
earlier? Such a mechanism could be useful in providing security guarantees for live streams,
among other applications.
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